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THOUGHTS

CONCERNING THE

PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

OF

MANNING & RECRUITING

THE

Britiſh Navy and Army.

DEDICATED TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EARL OF CHATHAM,
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY,

AND

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR GEORGE YONGE,
SECRETARY AT WAR.

BY

THE HON. AND REV. JAMES COCHRANE,

VICAR OF MANFIELD, IN THE COUNTY OF YORK, AND FORMERLY CHAPLAIN TO THE EIGHTY-SECOND REGIMENT OF FOOT.

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TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE EARL OF CHATHAM,

FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY,

AND

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR GEORGE YONGE,

SECRETARY AT WAR,

THE

FOLLOWING THOUGHTS,

CONCERNING

THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

OF

MANNING AND RECRUITING

THE BRITISH NAVY AND ARMY,

ARE

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

TO

THE BRITISH NAVY AND ARMY,

AND

ESPECIALLY TO THE GALLANT

CONCERNING

THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS

OF

THE BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY

AFFAIRS

IN

WRITING AND RECEIVING

THE

LETTER OF CHATHAM,

FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY,

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR GEORGE AUNGIER,

AND

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SECRETARY AT WAR.

THOUGHTS

CONCERNING THE

PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

OF

MANNING and *RECRUITING*

THE BRITISH NAVY AND ARMY.

TO the parent country of ſo extenſive an empire as the Britiſh, having poſſeſſions in every part of the globe, many external circumſtances muſt happen in the courſe of human affairs, which, in a certain degree, muſt make her alter her internal conſtitution, ſo as to ſecure theſe diſtant poſſeſſions. The queſtion, therefore, in regard to theſe internal alterations, turns upon this nice point, Will they, when they take place, be of more advantage than diſadvantage to her? Or, in other words, Is a ſmall internal inconvenience to be borne for the ſake of a great external bleſſing? Upon this reſts the defence of the Thoughts here ſuggeſted, concerning the Conſtitutional Principles of Perſonal Service that ought to be adopted in future, for the ſupport of the Britiſh Navy and Army. As it has long been a common and weak prejudice to contraſt the intereſts of the navy againſt the intereſts of the army, ſo the folly of doing it is expoſed, in this tract, by

proving, that the Conſtitution of neither is fixed upon ſuch Principles, as are calculated to call forth the utmoſt exertions this country is capable of in time of war. The inveſtigation of the Conſtitutional Principles that ought to be adopted, in recruiting both navy and army, merits attention highly as a point of public finance, ſince one real vigorous campaign commonly ſaves future ones, and an immenſe expenditure of money.

It was a maxim obſerved by the Romans in their conqueſts, that they adopted every improvement in the art of war, wherein they thought themſelves excelled by their enemies. This circumſtance raiſed that nation to a greater pitch of greatneſs than any other in ancient hiſtory. Far from adhering obſtinately, like other nations, to the ſyſtem of war they were taught by their forefathers, they prudently varied it according to the nature of the reſiſtance they met; and, in their progreſſive conqueſts of the then known world, by obſerving the above maxim, they gathered ſtrength from every nation they ſubdued.

When we ſee that Rome, even the former miſtreſs of the world, never bluſhed to own herſelf capable of being taught, ought not ſo illuſtrious an example to teach Great Britain, that ſhe may confeſs herſelf ſtill under the corrective rod of experience? As the French have of late adopted many improvements from the Britiſh navy; it becomes us, therefore, to examine what we can glean from them.

The moſt important that preſents itſelf to our conſideration, is one introduced into France by Lewis XIV. who obliged each pariſh in his kingdom to afford a number of recruits for the army, according to its number, fit to carry arms. Thus, in France, the military exigency of the ſtate is immediately ſupplied, and the demand of recruits for the army is never felt as a grievance, ſince it is equally divided among ſo many pariſhes. In Great Britain, were they to adopt this plan both for the navy and army, as is pointed out in the ſequel of this tract, it would greatly ſtrengthen the executive hands of government, and enable it to anticipate

many

many evils that may happen to this country, upon the commencement of a war. As the conſtitution of this country is ſuch, that it empowers naval officers to man their ſhips immediately by impreſſing men, it is certainly a ridiculous circumſtance, that the army is not put upon as advantageous a footing, as far as the nature of ſuch ſervice will admit.

It is only from the co-operation of their powers, that either our own ſecurity at home can be preſerved, our enemies foreign ſettlements attacked to advantage, or our own defended when invaded.

It has been often agitated, as a point of ſpeculation, whether or not the Britiſh army and navy would be better manned and ſupplied with recruits, by obliging each pariſh to turn out a proportional quota of men, than by the preſent method of impreſs, or beating up.

In reality it admits of no doubt, but that there are capital defects at preſent in the plans of recruiting both ſervices in time of war; neither of them are ſufficiently executive, and, by procraſtination, lead the public into an enormous expenditure of money. The difficulty of contriving an effectual plan for recruiting ſuch ſervices, conſiſts in the following circumſtance, that it ſhould be ſo calculated as to fix the men as volunteers in each ſervice, and not drive them, as brutes, upon compulſion. A certain degree of compulſion is abſolultely neceſſary to ſecure a certain return of men to the Board of Admiralty, and Secretary at War; but it ſhould be of ſuch a nature as to fall more upon public bodies of men, than upon individuals; or, in other words, that the recruits obtained ſhould appear as much as poſſible the repreſentatives of ſuch public bodies.

To conſider this ſubject in the manner it ought to be, the meaſures herein recommended for recruiting the navy and army, will be ſtated and contraſted with the method now in uſe, in which the latter will be proved not efficient in time of war, and productive of an enormous expenditure of money.

In every country there are but two ways in which the individuals of it can pay the tribute of naval and military ſervice due to the government they are under, *viz.* either by their own perſonal ſervice, or by paying an able ſubſtitute. Whatever arguments, therefore, are applicable to individuals in regard to this point, are ſtill ſtronger when applied to collective bodies of men. The following meaſures can never be objected to by the inhabitants of any county or pariſh, as fundamentally inconſiſtent with ideas of Britiſh liberty; when government offers the alternative to them, the choice or preference is an act of their own will.

In this tract, therefore, it is aſſumed as a conſtitutional principle, that the various diſtricts in the Britiſh empire are bound to afford recruits for both navy and army, when called upon by government. The propriety of which poſtulatum may be further proved, by ſhewing, that, as in France and other countries, with whom we have been accidentally at war, they do ſo, ſo we ought to fight them upon the ſame principle.

It is curious to obſerve the contrariety of principles upon which the Britiſh navy and army are now recruited. 1*ſt*, The navy is ſupplied with ſeamen more upon compulſion than inclination: 2*dly*, The marines are all ſuppoſed to be volunteers: 3*dly*, The regulars are required to be volunteers: 4*thly*, The militia are ballotted and raiſed upon compulſion.

Until the recruiting of all theſe ſervices is founded upon one uniform principle, the intereſt of one ſervice will always claſh with that of the other ſervices. It is evident from the above ſtate, that the regular army which is raiſed both for home and foreign duty, whether offenſive or defenſive, is by no means ſo well conſtituted as the militia, which is raiſed entirely for home defence. The reſult of which is, that the latter, in time of war, picks up all the beſt men in the kingdom for recruits, as was experienced during the American war. The following plans point out how far perſonal compulſion and inclination ought to be blended, to produce real exertion and œconomy in time of war.

PLAN

PLAN for RECRUITING and MANNING the Britiſh NAVY.

THE preſent method of impreſs for the ſea-ſervice of this country, may admit of great improvements in point of enforcement and regularity through all the Britiſh empire. If the Board of Admiralty wiſh to man the navy expeditely, they ſhould ſpecify in the Gazette the number of ſeamen and landſmen wanted for government-ſervice. 2*dly*, They ſhould likewiſe lay a ſtrict embargo upon all the ports of Great Britain, until the demands of government for ſeamen are ſatisfied. The ſame idea ſhould be extended *mutatis mutandis* to Ireland, and all other parts of naval importance in the Britiſh dominions.

This method will oblige the merchants, and maſters of ſhips, in every port of Great Britain, and her other poſſeſſions, to aſſiſt government as much as poſſible in procuring men, both by bounties, and their own perſonal influence; becauſe the embargo upon their trade will not be taken off, until the number of men ſpecified in the Gazette is procured. According to the preſent method of impreſs, the ports are open, the maſters of ſhips are at liberty to go to ſea, if their crews can elude the vigilance of the preſs-gangs. But if they were ſhut during the impreſs for government-ſervice, the ſeamen would be under the neceſſity, from the want of bread, to enter on board the men of war. When the number of ſeamen ſpecified in the Gazette is obtained, all impreſs ſhould ceaſe, and the public promiſe of government ſhould be kept ſacred,—That no impreſs ſhall take place again, until proper notice is given of it in the public Gazette. It is evident this method of manning the navy would cauſe much leſs ſtagnation in trade than the one now in uſe. According to the preſent method of impreſſing ſeamen, the merchants have no intereſt in aſſiſting government, ſince the impreſs never ceaſes during the continuance of war. Whereas, by the method here propoſed, of ſpecifying in the Gazette the number of ſeamen wanted, for manning the navy,

navy, every conſiderable ſea-port in Great Britain and Ireland, ſenſible of the conſequences of an embargo upon their ſhipping, would ſoon know the exact quota of men they ought to contribute, when the demand is made from government.

The Society of Watermen in the port of London, is a caſe in point, who, upon the eve of every war, ſend out five hundred, or a thouſand men, for the uſe of the navy, as repreſentatives of their body.

The new navigation-act, lately paſſed by Parliament for the regiſtering of ſhips, affords ſufficient data to the Board of Admiralty to fix the proportion of ſeamen that each port ſhould procure for the navy, *viz.* according to the quantity of their reſpective tonnage. When, upon a declaration of war, therefore, any port delivers over to the tenders upon the impreſs-ſervice, their proportion of ſeamen, the embargo upon ſuch port ſhould be taken off, and her ſhips ſhould go free from impreſs, until the next call for men is made in the Gazette. It is evident, that this plan of procuring ſeamen will raiſe an emulation between the ports. For inſtance, if a certain demand is made by the Board of Admiralty from the ports of Shields and Sunderland, for their reſpective proportion of ſeamen, the firſt that procures her number will have the embargo taken off her ſhips.

To compoſe the ſhip's company of a man of war, it is by no means requiſite that all the crew ſhould be ſeamen; one-third is only required to be ſeamen, the other two-thirds may be compoſed of marines properly diſciplined.

It is a great defect in the preſent method of manning the navy, that they are obliged to take all men that offer, or men ſent from jails.

Nothing contributes more to make our proper-bred ſeamen diſlike the naval ſervice, becauſe, in a manner, it ſeems to claſs them with felons.

Beſides, it is well known, that proper attention cannot be paid, in this manner, to the health of the crews of ſuch ſhips, when

theſe landſmen, or felons from jails, may communicate infectious diſorders to all the ſhip's company.

In the preceding obſervations, it is ſhown, that when Parliament votes 60,000, 80,000, or 100,000 ſeamen for the ſervice of the year, there is no occaſion for above one-third of theſe to be real ſeamen, the remainder of ſuch numbers ought to be draughted from the marine regulars.

In the preſent equipment of fleets, upon a declaration of war, the firſt ſquadron fitted out has more than her proper proportion of ſeamen, conſidering that other ſhips are to be manned when they are gone to ſea.

The regulations here recommended will cure this complaint, becauſe, by having a ſufficient number of marine regulars at Portſmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, two-thirds of the crews of ſuch ſhips may be compoſed of ſuch.

This enables the commanding officers at each port, to reſerve the proper proportion of ſeamen for future ſhips. At preſent, as faſt as ſeamen, upon the eve of a war, are brought in by the tenders upon the impreſs-ſervice, all hands are turned on board of the ſquadron fitting out for ſea. According to this method, the firſt ſquadron gone to ſea have more than their due proportion of ſeamen; the neceſſary conſequence of which is, that the remaining ſhips, when fitted out, muſt have more than their due proportion of landſmen.

According to the method of manning the navy here ſpecified, the number of ſeamen wanted for the whole navy is proved not to be one-third of what it is ſuppoſed to be. Thus, ſuppoſing 120,000 men neceſſary to man the navy, 40,000 ſeamen would be only required in the proportion of one-third to ſuch number. It might therefore be an eaſy matter for the different ports in Great Britain, to procure, at different inſtalments, as ſhould be ſpecified in the Gazette, one-third of the ſeamen voted by Parliament.

The preſent method of ſea-impreſs, as it continues during the whole war, ſo it deſtroys the merchant-ſervice, as a nurſery for ſeamen;

ſeamen; whereas, according to the method here propoſed, of requiring from the different ſea-ports one-third of the men requiſite to man the whole navy, at various inſtalments, the merchant-ſervice will remain as a nurſery, becauſe their ſhips will be protected from impreſs until the next notice is given in the Gazette. It is a notorious fact, that at preſent, during war, the crews of our merchantmen are compoſed of old infirm men, and foreigners, which is a ſhame and reproach to our maritime laws.

By defining the principles of protection from ſea-impreſs, the exertions of the different ſea-ports, in aid of government, will move as regularly as clock-work; and the merchant-ſervice will be always manned by ſuch hands as may, in ſome future period, ſerve their country on board of a man of war. If the maritime coaſts of the kingdom afford one-third of the men requiſite for manning the navy, it is but juſt, that the internal parts of the country ſhould contribute the other two-thirds, according to the plan hereafter mentioned, for recruiting the marine regulars.

The plan laid down in this and the remaining part of this tract, will give government the moſt thorough knowledge, how to proportion the building of men of war, according to its capability of manning them.

This is a moſt uſeful ſcience in point of œconomy and information, concerning the degree of exertion that the naval power of Great Britain may be puſhed to.

To conclude: It is a circumſtance that merits particular obſervation, that ſeamen deſerve every encouragement that can poſſibly be given to them in this country. They ſhould therefore have a legal demand, beſides their allowance from the eſtabliſhment of Greenwich, upon their reſpective pariſhes, for a certain annual penſion, increaſing in the ratio of time paſſed in the King's ſervice, or the wounds they have received.

So uſeful and honourable ſubjects ſhould meet with every encouragement and ſupport that the conſtitution and reſources of the Britiſh empire can poſſibly afford.

PLAN

PLAN for recruiting the Britiſh ARMY.

HAVING in the preceding Plan ſhown the propriety of government's adopting one uniform principle for recruiting at leaſt two-thirds of the navy, and the whole Britiſh army, it may be proper now to ſtate, *1ſt*, The public inconveniences of the preſent method of recruiting the army: *2dly*, To contraſt to it the method here propoſed, and to ſhew how the meaſures propoſed in both the plans ſuggeſted in this tract, will operate as a complete ſyſtem of national police.

The firſt circumſtance that preſents itſelf to our conſideration, in ſtating the public diſadvantages of the preſent method of recruiting the Britiſh army, is the uncertainty of the returns of men from the officers upon that ſervice, to the Secretary at War. Thus, according to the preſent method, the exigencies of the ſtate can never be provided for in that regular manner they ought to be. It will always be the caſe, and may it ever remain ſo, that the inhabitants of the Britiſh empire will reaſon freely concerning the propriety or impropriety of the meaſures purſued by their governors. If they approve of them, (in the language of addreſs), they will ſupport them with their lives and fortunes. If they diſapprove, government, according to the preſent ſyſtem, will find great difficulty in recruiting the army. This obſervation was well verified in the beginning of the American war, when government found ſo much difficulty in recruiting the old eſtabliſhment of the army, that they were obliged to hire troops from Germany; and Lord Barrington, then Secretary at War, from the abſolute neceſſity of the ſervice, was compelled to add twelve new regiments to the old eſtabliſhment. Commiſſions were granted to the officers, on condition of their raiſing a certain quota of men; and the high bounties given, were the only inducement that could have brought ſo many men to liſt at that time. From the particulars mentioned above, it may be juſtly inferred, that the public ſervice will be carried on more expeditely

and uniformly, by obliging each pariſh to turn out a certain number of men, according to the exigency of the ſtate. It may be mentioned too, as a private inconvenience of the preſent method of inliſting men, that no attention is paid to this circumſtance, whether or not a man has a large family, or whether he is a manufacturer, the loſs of whom is a detriment to trade.

All theſe circumſtances prove, that it is bad policy in any commercial ſtate, to allow an indiſcriminate kidnapping of men for its military ſervice, when certainly better may be procured by ballot, or from the deliberate choice of the gentlemen of each pariſh. There is one circumſtance which recommends ſtrongly the plan propoſed in this tract, that the demands for men will fall ſo lightly upon the different pariſhes, as not to be felt as a grievance. Whereas, in the mode of raiſing men, during laſt war, in Scotland, for the new levies, more particularly in the Highlands, ſome diſtricts were almoſt depopulated, and many of the beſt manufacturers of the weſt of Scotland ſwept away to America, where one day or other they will eſtabliſh thoſe very manufactures they uſed to export to that country. When the common people of England can earn one ſhilling, one ſhilling and ſixpence, or two ſhillings, by labour, it is unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, they will prefer ſixpence, which is the pay of a common ſoldier. The high price of labour alſo paid of late by the farmers, and maſter-manufacturers, to their workmen, is another reaſon why the recruiting ſervice has not ſucceeded as well in England as it uſed to do. Though many manifeſted, during laſt war, a laudable and public ſpirit, in regard to home-defence, yet they were not at all inclined to hazard their lives abroad. This averſion to ſerving in the army abroad, is growing ſtronger and ſtronger every day among the common people, from their preferring the militia-ſervice to that of the regulars.

Government, in any future war, muſt therefore adopt ſome plan ſimilar to the one propoſed in this tract, to recruit the Britiſh

tiſh navy and army effectually. When our natural enemies upon the continent of Europe have ſuch immenſe ſtanding armies, and are at the ſame time equal, if not ſuperior to us by ſea, in number of ſhips and men, it is ſurely the height of folly and madneſs, not to put our navy and army upon an equal reſpectable footing, by adopting ſuch meaſures as will bring both ſervices to their meridian of exertion, upon the commencement of a war. Without it is done ſoon, this country will be ſtript of her ſugar-iſlands in any future diſpute. So far from government being able to ſend a ſufficient number of men to garriſon our ſugar-iſlands, they had not even men enough to anſwer the demands formerly of the American war. Thus the hands of government muſt always be tied up, in regard to military enterpriſe, as long as the preſent mode of recruiting the navy and army continues in force. Until it is altered, we can ſtrike no blow to advantage, upon the commencement of a war, nor can we parry one effectually, when aimed at us. The experience we have gained in the late American conteſt, ought to teach us to adopt ſuch plans as will bring the whole ſtrength of the empire to bear effectually to a point. Procraſtination in military operations, muſt be the ruin of the reſources of this or any other country, when ſhe has to maintain nominal fleets and armies, neither fully recruited nor diſciplined. France and Spain are too ſenſible of the defect of the Britiſh ſervice, in regard to the idea of raiſing men expeditely as volunteers. They muſt know, therefore, it muſt require ſome conſiderable time before our army is ſo recruited and diſciplined, as to oppoſe their veteran troops in the field. Beſides, the more the above powers increaſe in maritime ſtrength, it becomes every day more neceſſary, that the Britiſh empire ſhould attend to the moſt effectual and patriotic means of keeping up a reſpectable force, ready to act upon emergency, either at home or abroad, ſo that the public money may not be expended in non-effective fleets and armies.

In the prefatory obſervations to theſe plans, it is ſhown, that Lewis XIV. introduced into France the method of recruiting his regular forces by draughts from the militia; and it is mentioned in Dr. Moore's travels through France, Switzerland, and Germany, that the ſame method is obſerved in Pruſſia; or, in other words, that the whole chief ſtanding army of that kingdom is militia; ſince, during peace, for many months of the year, they go home to their friends, to work at the occupations they have originally been bred up to. The ſame plan ought to be adopted in the Britiſh empire, to have a militia ſo conſtituted, that it can afford recruits, when required by government, for the marine regulars that are to compoſe two-thirds of the compliment of the Britiſh navy, and alſo what recruits are required for the land forces.

All diſtinctions between regulars and marines ſhould be entirely aboliſhed, when they are both recruited from the ſame quarter. It may be queried, Whether all purchaſe or ſale of commiſſions of the rank of captains or ſubalterns ought not to be aboliſhed, and whether ſubaltern officers, when required in the regulars, ought not to be choſen from the different battalions of militia, the recommendation of ſuch officers to be made by the majority of officers in each battalion of militia?

Officers in the regulars, according to this plan, would riſe by ſeniority until the rank of captain. In the rank of major and lieutenant-colonel, the ſale of commiſſions ſhould be allowed as a reward for former ſervices.

All regiments ought to be named from ſome particular county or diſtrict; from the battalion of which militia, in time of peace, they are recruited. In time of war, they muſt be recruited from the general rendezvous of recruits, ſince the accidents of war might make ſuch demands for men fall too heavy upon particular regiments of militia.

The Board of Admiralty ſhould notify to the Secretary at War, the number of marine regulars required for ſervice.

The

The Secretary at War ſhould be required annually, or half yearly, to ſpecify to the Lord-lieutenant, and Sheriff of each county, what is the proportion of men their reſpective battalions of militia are to afford for the ſervice of the regular army.

In reflecting on the means for diminiſhing the expenditure, and improving the police of Great Britain, it is impoſſible to overlook the methods that have hitherto been adopted for recruiting the navy and army, as theſe ſeem to be liable to many objections that admit of being eaſily removed, ſo as to recruit both ſervices effectually, ſave public expenditure, and regulate the police ſo completely over the kingdom, that the officers of each pariſh ſhall have a thorough knowledge of the character and livelihood of each perſon in their reſpective diſtricts.

The practice of impreſſing ſeamen into the ſervice of their country, though it has hitherto been permitted, on account of the ſuppoſed neceſſity of doing it, has always been complained of as an infringement of that liberty, which every ſubject in this country, who has not, in the general opinion of his countrymen, been guilty of any treſpaſs on the rights of ſociety, ought ever to enjoy, and therefore, has been tolerated by the nation with great reluctance. But with regard to the army, no ſuch toleration has ever been allowed.

To raiſe recruits for the army, therefore, great ſums of money are required to induce men to enter into the ſervice during the courſe of every war; and the expence attending the impreſſing of ſeamen is ſtill more conſiderable.

Any plan, therefore, which promiſes effectually to recruit the militia, ſo as to afford the neceſſary draughts of men for the navy and army, on every preſſing emergency, in a much ſhorter time than formerly, and at no expence, while it effectually ſecures the privileges of every Britiſh ſubject, and tends to guard againſt civil treſpaſſes in the ſtate, ought to be liſtened to with attention. Such is the plan here propoſed.

During

During the courſe of laſt war, authority was given to juſtices of peace, and magiſtrates, within their reſpective diſtricts, to take up, for his Majeſty's ſervice, vagrants and other diſorderly perſons, who might fall under their cognizance. But experience has ſhown, that this mode of obtaining men is liable to great abuſe, ſo that in ſome caſes it has become an engine of oppreſſion; in conſequence whereof, it has acted very feebly as a regulation of police, and has proved altogether inadequate to the purpoſes of recruiting either the navy or the army.

To remedy all theſe defects, it is propoſed, that the church-wardens of each pariſh ſhould deliver in at the quarter-ſeſſions, upon oath, the number of men fit to carry arms in ſuch pariſh, after affixing a liſt of their names at the church-door for two or three ſucceſſive Sundays. Thus the quota of recruits for the militia might be fixed then by the deputy-lieutenants of each county, and the allotment for each pariſh or diſtrict.

The diſtricts or pariſhes muſt then, by premiums, procure volunteers, if practicable, among their own number, fit to carry arms; if not, they may either ballot, according to the method now uſed for the militia, or proceed in the following method, which will veſt in the community at large the power of ſelecting proper perſons, inſtead of ſuch power being veſted in any particular order or deſcription of men. Let a meeting of the houſeholders in each pariſh, (or of two or three pariſhes together, where the numbers are ſmall, and few men are to be raiſed) be called together on a certain ſpecified day. Let each of theſe houſeholders be required to bring with him a piece of paper, in which ſhould be written the names and ſirnames of one, two, or more perſons, according to the number of men then wanted for the militia, whom he thinks could be beſt ſpared from the diſtrict of which they are members. All which pieces of paper ſhould be ſo rolled up and folded, as that no perſon could ſee the names until opened up. Each houſeholder to anſwer to his name when called, according to the order on the roll, and deliver his paper

to

to an officer appointed to receive the ſame. The names of the perſons thus given in, ſhould be then, in preſence of the meeting, written out by the clerk, a mark being made oppoſite to each name, for every time it was repeated by a different perſon. When the whole is ſummed up, thoſe perſons againſt whom there appears the greateſt number of votes, ſhall be the perſons fixed upon for the militia. By this procedure, every man would be tried by an impartial jury of his peers in his vicinage; and as the whole community is called, without exception, to ſuch meeting, there would be no reaſon to complain of injuſtice, becauſe the partialities of ill-intentioned individuals could have no effect, as the lot could only fall upon thoſe who are regarded as the fitteſt objects to ſerve their king and country.

This mode of recruiting would be evidently highly œconomical, and at all times effectual for recruiting the militia in the ſhorteſt time poſſible; and, conſidered as a regulation of police, would be attended with the following beneficial conſequences:

1ſt, It would operate as a perpetual reſtraint upon young men, againſt committing diſorders in ſociety, that might tend to render them obnoxious to the neighbourhood; as they would know well, that, according to this mode of trial, no particular crime is required to be ſpecified, nor any witneſſes adduced, every individual being at perfect liberty to judge according to his own feelings and opinion; ſo that perſons whoſe general behaviour had given riſe to ſuſpicion of diſhoneſty, or who, by riotous living or improper behaviour, had given cauſe of offence to the peaceable part of ſociety, would be neceſſarily fixed upon by this ſpecies of ſelection, and turned over to a mode of life where theſe diſorders would be repreſſed and corrected. It is not to be doubted, but that the fear of being ſent off in this parochial manner, would operate very powerfully as a check to many youthful irregularities, which, if they had been indulged, might have ended in great enormities.

2dly,

2dly, This ſpecies of ſelection would tend perhaps in a more powerful manner than any device that has hitherto been adopted, to diminiſh the poors rates. It is well known, that truſting to the poors rates, many perſons who are well able to work, lead a life of great diſſipation for many years, and though guilty of no crime that the law can lay hold of, very ſoon become a burden on the community of which they are members; and as it is to be ſuppoſed, that reſpectable houſeholders, who muſt in the end be burdened by theſe perſons, would keep a ſharp look-out for ſuch as had engaged in that career, ſo they would be the firſt ſelected for the militia, by whoſe removal the community would be freed from their bad examples, which might corrupt others.

To prevent all complaints of any abuſes in the manner of exerciſing the above power, by the houſeholders of any pariſh or pariſhes, a diſcretionary power ought to be veſted in a jury of the chief gentlemen of property in the neighbourhood, to approve or diſapprove of ſuch men as are fixed upon by the above meeting for the militia. After their approbation, if the above men fly the country, they ought to be dealt with as deſerters from the army.

The two moſt operative circumſtances, to induce ſeamen or landſmen to enter into our naval or military ſervice, are certain ideas of preſent encouragement, and future ſupport in old age. In regard to the former, it is certain, that in no European ſervice, either by ſea or land, are men better clothed and fed than in the Britiſh ſervice. The deficiency or fault conſiſts in our not having proper and adequate ideas of future ſupport for ſeamen and ſoldiers, increaſing in the *ratio* of the length of time ſpent by them in the ſervice of their country. To do this, the various funds of Greenwich and Chelſea Hoſpitals ſhould be thrown into one general fund, from which annual penſions ſhould be paid to ſeamen and ſoldiers, increaſing according to the number of years they have ſerved, or the wounds they have received. This penſion ſhould only be in part, the reſidue to be made up by pariſh-

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penſions, under the control of the deputy-lieutenants of each county. This method of providing for old and maimed ſailors and ſoldiers, will ſave much money now laid out in the maintenance of Greenwich and Chelſea Hoſpitals, as great part of the money granted by Parliament for the ſupport of the old men, is conſumed by the officers of the hoſpitals, and in repairing the buildings. An old ſoldier or ſailor will live with much more comfort, when he has his reſidence in his own pariſh, among his relations and former neighbours, and will receive from his double penſion a more ample maintenance than he does at preſent, according to the eſtabliſhment of either of the above hoſpitals.

When ſoldiers, who have been diſcharged at the end of a war from the marine regulars, enter again into the militia, all future ſervices in the militia ought to be deemed part of the time required to entitle them to a government and parochial penſion.

In calling forth the different diſtricts throughout Great Britain and Ireland, to afford, for the uſe of the army and navy, a quota of men proportionable to their number, fit to carry arms, it will be eſtabliſhed, as a point of public honour and emulation, which diſtrict ſhall ſupply both ſervices with the beſt and ableſt men. By veſting the recommendation of ſubaltern officers for the regular army in the officers of militia, it intereſts all the gentlemen of landed property in Great Britain and Ireland, to exert themſelves in forwarding the good of both ſervices.

THE Author of this tract hopes, he has proved it to be a point of national importance, that the conſtitutions of the navy and army of theſe kingdoms, ſhould be founded upon ſuch principles, as are here ſuggeſted: But their importance will appear more evident, upon the future renewal, of the charter of the Eaſt-India Company, when it may be propoſed, as given out in ſome late debates in parliament, to conſolidate the body of the Britiſh army, with the army now in the Eaſt Indies. If this meaſure were adopted, it would open to the landed intereſt, an

ample field of proviſion for their connexions, as the recommendation of all ſubaltern officers to his Majeſty, would belong to the officers of the militia. Such propoſal by no means ſuperſedes, the right of appointment of officers, now in the crown, but only limits the choice of ſuch to a particular claſs of men; the friends of whom are the officers who conſtitute the militia of theſe kingdoms, and are moſtly men of conſiderable landed property.

To conclude: It is a matter worthy of obſervation, that above one half, or three parts out of four, of the common men in the militia of England are ſubſtitutes. Upon the event of this late diſturbance with Spain, it is a fact well known, that moſt of theſe men would have turned out as volunteers for the regulars, had their officers, and the militia laws allowed them to do ſo. Upon ſuch principle, were draughts from the militia to ſupply the regulars with recruits, it might in time become a proper conſtitutional method, of providing for thoſe men, who have a natural turn for a military life, or of making ſuch, as at preſent diſturb the peace of ſociety, uſeful members of the community, according to the plan of parochial allotments laid down in this tract.

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